

Shah July 2, 1974.

27 JUN 74 05 06Z

[Redacted]

Approved

27 June

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA ZARF 262223Z JUN 74 SPECIAL DESIGNEES~~

CITE [Redacted]

HR70-14
(U)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2008

TO: TEHRAN.

HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLE CHANNELS

FOR MR. [Redacted] AND AMBASSADOR HELMS ONLY.

1. FOLLOWING FYI IS AN ITEM FROM THE 12 JUNE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
DAILY WHICH IS BASED ON SPECULATIVE ANALYSIS: WHICH IS BASED ON SPECULATIVE ANALYSIS

[Large Redacted Block]

"THIS IS THE FIRST SIGN THAT BAGHDAD MAY BE GETTING THE SCUD, WHICH HAS A 160-MILE RANGE. THE SOVIETS SHIPPED SCUD MISSILES TO EGYPT LAST FALL AND REPORTEDLY SUPPLIED THEM TO SYRIA.

"DELIVERY OF SCUDS TO IRAQ WOULD INCREASE THE SHAH'S CONCERN ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF. SCUDS BASED IN IRAQ COULD NOT REACH TEHRAN, BUT AIRFIELDS WITHIN WESTERN IRAN WOULD BE WITHIN RANGE.

"IF SCUDS SHOW UP IN IRAQ, THE SHAH WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY SEEK A WEAPONS SYSTEM TO COUNTER THESE MISSILES.

"THE PARTIAL EASING OF THE STRAINS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN RECENT MONTHS WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED, BUT THE SHAH WOULD BE MORE WARY IN ANY

AGE 02 [redacted] ~~TOP SECRET~~ UMBRA ZARF
BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAQ.

2. THIS MESSAGE IS ONLY TO ALERT YOU TO POSSIBLE FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT. ON THE BASIS OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, IF
FOR NO OTHER REASON, RECOMMEND NOT RELEASING THIS INFORMATION
TO THE SHAH. E2 IMPDET.

~~TOP SECRET~~ UMBRA ZARF

SHR ARF

*Mr. Ambassador:
I did not address
this question in my
"stopper" answer to
the message on
27 June.*

[redacted]